Peripatetic school (The)
- The Peripatetic school1 Robert W.Sharples THE HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL AND OF ARISTOTLE’S WRITINGS The history of Peripatetic philosophy after Aristotle falls into two phases, divided by the renewal of interest in the works we now possess after their publication by Andronicus in the first century BC. Initially, Aristotle’s own associates in the Lyceum and their successors carried on the work of the school. When Aristotle left Athens for Euboea at the news of the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, the headship of the school passed to Theophrastus of Eresus, who had collaborated with Aristotle at least since the latter’s stay in Assos in Asia Minor in 347–345 BC. When Theophrastus died in 288/7 or 287/6 BC, he was succeeded by Strato of Lampsacus, who remained head of the school until his own death eighteen years later. The school was initially a centre of Macedonian influence in Athens, as it had been in Aristotle’s own lifetime; Demetrius of Phalerum, a member of the school, was regent in Athens for Cassander from 318 to 307, and it was probably he who gave Theophrastus, though a resident alien, the right of owning property. The philosophical schools were expelled from Athens for a year after Demetrius’ fall, and this may well have been motivated by hostility to the Peripatetics in particular. The early activity of the school was characterised, as it had already been in Aristotle’s lifetime, by the collection and interpretation of information in every field, and by the raising and the attempted resolution of theoretical difficulties. Examples of two very different themes in the collection of information are provided by the best known of the surviving works of Theophrastus. The Characters is a series of sketches of more or less imperfect personality types; it has been variously interpreted as material for a study of comedy, for the presentation of character in rhetoric, or for the study of character which the ancients called ‘ethics’ but we might rather classify as psychology. Theophrastus’ botanical writings, the Researches on Plants (Historia plantarum) and Explanations of Plants (De causis plantarum) are the earliest systematic botanical texts to survive. The contrast between the Researches and Explanations, between the collection of data and the more theoretical work, reflects Aristotle’s own practice in his zoological writings; but we should beware of assuming that the collection of material, and particularly its arrangement, is not already guided by theoretical considerations. The botanical subject-matter indeed requires conscious consideration, or tacit re-adjustment, of the Aristotelian theoretical framework; what is unnatural may become natural with time (Explanations of Plants 4.11.7), and the way in which art helps nature in the cultivation of plants, both art and nature setting out to achieve what is best, prompts consideration of whether the true end of a tree’s growth is to produce fertile seed or edible fruit—edible by humans, that is (cf. especially Explanations of Plants 1.16). Theophrastus is prepared, in discussing wild and cultivated species, to speak about natural kinds in a flexible way, describing reversion from cultivated to wild varieties as changes of kind (genos).<sup>2</sup> But—whatever view one takes of Aristotle’s own position on the fixedness of natural kinds in zoology3—Theophrastus does not explicitly present his approach to natural history as different from that of Aristotle. The Lyceum was also active in collecting the views of earlier scholars: Eudemus compiled a history of mathematics, Menon of medicine, and Theophrastus the opinions of earlier philosophers about the natural world and about sense-perception. Among other historical activities were the work of Theophrastus’ contemporaries Aristoxenus (on music) and Dicaearchus (on cultural history and biographies of philosophers and poets). Theophrastus’ fellow-townsman Phainias wrote on botany (fragments 36–49 Wehrli) and on political history. Theophrastus’ concern with earlier writers was not, however, purely historical; like Aristotle himself, he discussed their views as a basis for establishing his own4— though he does seem to have gone into more detail than Aristotle, and some interest in historical detail for its own sake cannot be excluded. There are similarities between the activity of the Lyceum in this period and those of the scholars and scientists of Ptolemaic Alexandria. The two traditions indeed overlapped; Hermippus, described as a ‘Peripatetic’ biographer (of a somewhat sensationalist kind) was a follower of the Alexandrian scholar Callimachus, and other historians too are described as Peripatetics. The contributions of the two centres differed in different fields. In zoology the Peripatetics wrote as natural scientists, the Alexandrian scholars as literary scholars and encyclopaedists, at one remove from their scientific subject-matter and concerned especially with the explaining of classical literary texts. In human anatomy and physiology, on the other hand, the Alexandrians, aided by their practice of dissection, were in the forefront.<sup>5</sup> It has often been held that Theophrastus, and to an even greater extent Strato, changed the emphasis of Peripatetic philosophy, with a progressive movement towards on empiricism and materialism. There is some truth in this picture; the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems, and other works wrongly attributed to Aristotle such as the Mechanics and On Things Heard (De audibilibus) which show this tendency, derive from this period of the school, and a notable example of empirical observation is Strato’s proof that falling bodies accelerate, from the fact that water which falls as a continuous stream breaks into separate droplets further down (fragment 73 in [5.57]). But the contrast with Aristotle himself can be overstated. For our knowledge of much of Theophrastus’ activity and all of Strato’s we are dependent on fragmentary reports by later writers. Writers like Plutarch, a Platonist, and Cicero, emphasising the differences between philosophers of the same school in the interests of neo-Academic sceptical debate, may not be the best guides to whether or not Strato is a good Aristotelian.<sup>6</sup> Plutarch indeed explicitly presents Strato as denying the involvement of purpose in the natural world, but this may be tendentious; for Aristotle also, in Physics 2, nature is not a conscious force. To show that there is a basis in some passages of Aristotle for a position adopted by Theophrastus or Strato does not indeed establish that it is not in some sense un-Aristotelian; divergence can take the form of selective emphasis and omission as well as of straight contradiction. But such divergence may be unconscious and unintentional; and since selective emphasis of particular aspects of Aristotle’s thought is not confined to Theophrastus and Strato, or even to Plutarch and Cicero, but is found among modern interpreters as well, we need to be aware of the standpoint from which a judgement of what is or is not Aristotelian is being made. Those who regard metaphysics as the central philosophical issue and theology, in the sense of the study of incorporeal principles, as central to metaphysics may well regard not only Theophrastus and Strato but later ancient Peripatetics too as neglecting or rejecting what they regard as Aristotle’s chief contributions. In a recent masterly short account of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes devoted just two pages ([5.164] 63–5) out of eighty-eight to Aristotle’s theology and the theory of the Unmoved Mover. This might have surprised St Thomas Aquinas and some other leading interpreters of Aristotle, ancient, medieval and modern; but Theophrastus and Strato might have found Barnes’ Aristotle more familiar than Aquinas’. One of the Theophrastean works to survive is his so-called Metaphysics (the original title is unknown). This has often been described as ‘a fragment’; it seems in fact to be complete, but it raises questions rather than answering them. In questioning two central Aristotelian doctrines, the explanation of natural phenomena in terms of purpose and the theory of the Unmoved Mover, it can readily be seen as indicating Theophrastus’ rejection of central Aristotelian doctrines—especially when Theophrastus can be seen as paving the way for Strato. However, Most in [5.50] has shown that some (but only some) of the examples of purpose in nature apparently rejected by Theophrastus are ones equally rejected by Aristotle himself, and has suggested that Theophrastus’ discussion is aimed not against Aristotelian teleology but against a more thorough-going Platonist version. And Theophrastus’ treatise does have a positive message, which is that the universe is an organised system in which the same degree of purposefulness and goodness should not be expected at every level (2 6a2, 5 8a3, 7 8a27; cf. Laks in [5.50] 237 ff.)—a theme we shall find recurring in later Peripatetics too. Theophrastus also emphasises the need for limits to enquiry (Metaphysics 8 9b21 and fragments 158–9 FHS and G). That Theophrastus did reject Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover seems probable enough; but Aristotle did not accept the theory of the Unmoved Mover throughout his career, and in any case raising objections is a thoroughly Aristotelian way of proceeding. Critics have been too ready to forget the problematic and exploratory nature of much of Aristotle’s own surviving works, and too ready to interpret his successors as abandoning what they themselves regard as crucial features of Aristotelianism rather than as continuing Aristotle’s enquiries (or sharing in them, for there is no reason to suppose that Theophrastus’ Metaphysics was not written in Aristotle’s lifetime).<sup>7</sup> Even where Aristotle’s own position can be easily determined those of his successors are not always clear. Steinmetz in [5.41] claims, as will be discussed in detail later, that Theophrastus modified the Aristotelian system of four sublunary elements. Theophrastus certainly begins his surviving treatise On Fire by raising general questions about the Aristotelian theory, but, characteristically, then turns aside from the general questions to investigate particular phenomena—concerning which some of his remarks do seem to reveal un-Aristotelian assumptions. At this point we may, like Steinmetz, suppose that Theophrastus did indeed develop a distinctive theory of his own, and look for other reports of Theophrastus’ views that seem to confirm this; or we may, with Gottschalk ([5.65] 80–1; [5.42] 2.4– 6), suppose that Theophrastus couples a general adherence to an Aristotelian framework with a flexibility and readiness to speculate in particular details. Gottschalk stresses, indeed, that Theophrastus paved the way for Strato to adopt a more revolutionary approach to physics. After Strato the Lyceum rapidly fell into decline. Strato’s successor Lyco (head of the school for forty-four years from 270/69 or 269/8 BC) was notable for his oratory, social standing and love of luxury rather than for science or philosophy; his successor Ariston of Ceos was noted chiefly for his biographical studies. It is probably to Ariston that we owe the preservation of the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and perhaps the list of Aristotelian titles in Diogenes Laertius. In the second century Critolaus, who accompanied the Academic Carneades and the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon in their visit to Rome in 155 BC, was philosophically active, chiefly in defending Aristotelian positions (the eternity of the world, the fifth heavenly element, and the inclusion of bodily and external goods as well as virtue as a constituent of happiness) against the Stoics; but he seems to have been the exception rather than the rule. Those for whom the most important aspects of Aristotelianism are those which they see Aristotle’s immediate successors as questioning, rejecting or neglecting have tended to see the decline of the Peripatetic school as a natural consequence of the change of emphasis. Others, themselves favouring an empiricist approach to the natural world, have seen Theophrastus and Strato as advancing scientific enquiry where Aristotle’s attitudes hindered it;<sup>8</sup> this equally seems to overstate the contrast between Aristotle and his successors. The real reasons for the decline of the Lyceum may be harder to recapture. Certainly the special sciences in the Hellenistic period developed an impetus of their own in institutions other than the Lyceum—notably medicine in Ptolemaic Alexandria; but that does not explain why zoology and botany, the sciences Aristotle and Theophrastus had made their own, declined in the Lyceum without developing elsewhere. Where philosophy in a narrower sense is concerned, the answer may be easier. Aristotle’s thought is guided by certain structures and assumptions, but within that framework it is characteristically questioning, open-ended and provisional. And Aristotle explicitly stressed, against Plato, the relative independence of the different branches of philosophical enquiry. For those who were attracted by comprehensive and dogmatic philosophical systems the Lyceum had nothing to offer that could compare with Epicureanism or the Stoa;<sup>9</sup> while for those who rejected dogmatism the Aristotelian approach must have seemed a poor second-best to the aggressive scepticism introduced to the Academy by Arcesilaus in the middle of the third century BC. Strato’s successors emphasised those aspects of the school’s activity, present indeed from the outset, that related to the general literary and rhetorical culture of the period, and this too may have lessened the distinctive appeal of the school. There is nothing un-Aristotelian in attention to the views and concerns of people in general, as a glance at the Nicomachean Ethics will show; but for Aristotle himself it was only the foundation on which he built. To speak of how Aristotle’s ‘unpublished’ writings might have seemed to Hellenistic readers assumes, indeed, that those who might have wanted to read them could have done so. The decline of the Lyceum is linked by Strabo and Plutarch with a story that Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ writings, left by Theophrastus not to Strato but to Neleus of Scepsis in the Troad, passed from Neleus to his descendants. They, having no interest in philosophy, hid the books in a cellar to prevent their seizure by the kings of Pergamum, who wanted to create a library to rival the one in Alexandria. Thus, according to the story, the ‘unpublished’ works of Aristotle—those which we now have, the originally ‘published’ works having been lost later in antiquity—were inaccessible until rediscovered in the first century BC, and the Peripatetics were unable ‘to do philosophy in a systematic way’ without them. The manuscripts were eventually recovered by the bibliophile Apellicon, who took them to Athens and published them, but inaccurately; they were then seized by the Roman general Sulla when he sacked the city in 86 BC, and taken to Rome, where they were copied by the grammarian Tyrannio. From his copies a new collection, which is the basis of the arrangement of Aristotle’s writings that exists today, was produced by Andronicus of Rhodes; this also included some works of Theophrastus.<sup>10</sup> It is true, as we shall shortly see, that the revival of Aristotelianism dates from Andronicus, and that it is different in character from what had preceded it; where the earlier Peripatetics had sought to continue Aristotle’s work, later writers are essentially looking back to it and commenting upon it. It is significant that Strabo supposes that one could not be a Peripatetic philosopher without access to texts of Aristotle himself; concentration on the study of canonical texts was a general characteristic of the period.<sup>11</sup> What is much less certain is that Aristotle’s works were indeed inaccessible in the intervening period. It is unlikely that even ‘unpublished’ works existed in only one copy; we know that different, and differing, copies of Aristotle’s Physics existed in the lifetime of Theophrastus, for Eudemus (fragment 6 Wehrli) wrote to him about a variant reading, and Strato left to Lyco ‘all the books, apart from those I have written myself’ (Diogenes Laertius 5.62).<sup>12</sup> The possibility remains that, if Aristotle’s works were little read in the Hellenistic period, this was not because they were unavailable but because—however strange this may seem to modern interpreters for whom Aristotle is a central figure in the whole history of philosophy—they were not considered of great interest. Aristotelian doctrines were indeed still referred to; but characteristic of the Hellenistic period is, not the study of Aristotle’s own works, but the compilation and use of summaries of the sort that underlie Cicero’s knowledge of Aristotle and the account in Areius Didymus (below). Examples of this type of writing include the ‘Aristotelian Divisions’ preserved in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Plato and in a manuscript in Venice<sup>13</sup> and the source of the account of Aristotelian philosophy in book 5 of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers.<sup>14</sup> The revival of Aristotelian studies which began with Andronicus’ collection (on which see Gottschalk [5.77] 1089–97) was different in kind from what had gone before, for the status of Aristotle’s text had changed. Aristotle’s immediate successors had indeed taken his works as a starting point; Eudemus’ Physics essentially followed Aristotle’s while clarifying certain issues (Wehrli [5.57] vol.8:87), and Boethius presents Theophrastus (fragment 72A FHS and G) as filling in the points that Aristotle had not fully covered. But for the early Peripatetics it was a matter of continuing Aristotle’s work, not of regarding him as the canonical authority to be interpreted. The writing of summaries of Aristotelian doctrines did not cease; but use was now made—to differing extents—of the treatises edited by Andronicus.<sup>15</sup> Nicolaus of Damascus, a courtier of Herod the Great, compiled, in addition to historical and ethnographical writings, a summary of Aristotle’s philosophy which collected together material on similar topics from different Aristotelian texts. This survives in a Syriac summary and in other fragments. A treatise by Nicolaus on plants, possibly part of the compendium, was translated from Syriac into Arabic in the ninth century AD, thence into Latin in the second half of the twelfth century, and thence back into Greek. In the process it became mis-attributed to Aristotle himself, and it is this re-translation that appears as On Plants in modern editions of Aristotle, though the falsity of the attribution was already realised in the Renaissance.<sup>16</sup> Areius Didymus, a Stoic and ‘court-philosopher’ to the emperor Augustus, wrote summaries of the teachings of the various schools. Of his treatment of the Peripatetics we possess the section on ethics, quoted at length by Stobaeus, and fragments of the section on physics; the doctrines they present are Aristotelian in content, and Areius sometimes used the texts made available by Andronicus, but the terminology and emphasis reflect Hellenistic preoccupations and Areius’ concern to stress the similarities between Peripatetic and Stoic ethics.<sup>17</sup> Other scholars, however, concentrated on the writing of commentaries on the newly popular Aristotelian texts. The earliest of these are now lost except for scattered quotations, having been replaced by later, often Neoplatonic works. Andronicus and his pupil Boethus<sup>18</sup> commented on the Categories and on other works; so too did Alexander of Aegae, teacher of the emperor Nero. The earliest surviving complete commentary is that of Aspasius (first half of the second century AD) on the Nicomachean Ethics; Adrastus of Aphrodisias’ explanations of the literary and historical references in the Ethics were incorporated into the later anonymous commentary on books 2–5.<sup>19</sup> But the earliest author from whom a considerable number of commentaries survives is Alexander of Aphrodisias, described as ‘the commentator’ by his successors; though even of his works only a part survives. Interest in Aristotle’s ‘published’ works declined as that in the ‘unpublished’ works in Andronicus’ collection developed; for Cicero, who either did not know of or was not interested in the texts edited by Andronicus, Aristotle still meant the Aristotle of the ‘published’ works, but he is perhaps the last major writer for whom this is true. The Lyceum may have ceased to exist as an institution at the time of Sulla’s sack of Athens.<sup>20</sup> But Athens continued to be a centre for philosophers of all schools. In AD 176 Marcus Aurelius established posts there for teachers of the four principal philosophies (Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean), and it may be to an appointment at Athens that Alexander refers in the dedication of his treatise On Fate, written between AD 198 and 209. Alexander of Aphrodisias would not in any case have been the first holder of the Athenian post; that may have been his older namesake, Alexander of Damascus. The institution of the imperial appointments only confirmed a situation that already existed; philosophers of the different schools were teaching in Athens—and engaging in lively polemic against each other—throughout the second century AD. Alexander’s commentaries do not yet show the adaptation to a context of formal teaching apparent in the later, Neoplatonic commentaries. They are discursive and open-ended, presenting alternative interpretations without always indicating a preference between them.<sup>21</sup> They seem to reflect the results of teaching and discussion rather than an actual record of the process. We also possess some collections of short discussions attributed to Alexander; there were once more that are now lost. Some of these take the form of problems in Aristotelian doctrine, or in the interpretation of particular texts, followed by solutions; others are expositions of particular passages, or summaries of texts or doctrines. Whether they are by Alexander himself has to be considered text by text. Since many of them are connected with themes dealt with in Alexander’s commentaries or in monographs by him, it is natural to assume that they at least originate from his school. But it has recently been suggested that some of them may be considerably later in date, though still concerned essentially with Aristotelian issues.<sup>22</sup> And this highlights a problem: that of the second disappearance of Aristotelianism, or rather its absorption into Neoplatonism. We know the names of Alexander’s teachers, and can identify some of their doctrines and his reaction against them. But we do not know the names of any of his pupils; and with one exception all ancient commentators on Aristotle after Alexander whose writings are known to us are Neoplatonists. There had long been a tendency on the part of Platonists to incorporate Aristotelian ideas into their expositions of Plato; some, notably the second-century AD Platonist Atticus, rebelled against this, but they were in the minority. Plotinus himself had the works of Aristotle and the commentaries of Alexander, among others, read in his school (Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 14). Subsequently, with the formalisation of the Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum, selected works of Aristotle were studied as a preliminary to the reading of Plato. The emphasis was on the logical and physical treatises and the work On the Soul; that explains why Aspasius’ commentary on the Ethics survived— there was no incentive to replace it—and why we have to wait until the twelfth century AD for commentaries on the Parva Naturalia, the zoological works, and the Rhetoric.<sup>23</sup> The exception to the general dominance of Platonists after Alexander is Themistius, who in the fourth century AD combined epideictic rhetoric with the production of explanatory paraphrases of Aristotle’s works. But Themistius’ Aristotelianism has no clear heritage; we cannot trace either its immediate antecedents or his successors. There are occasional references to other individuals as ‘Peripatetics’, such as the bishop Anatolius of Alexandria in the third century AD; and as late as AD 500 Dorus from Arabia is described as having spent more of his life in the study of Aristotle than he should have, before being introduced to the higher study of Plato by Isidorus.<sup>24</sup> But none of this amounts to the continued existence of a distinctive Aristotelian tradition. The second decline of Aristotelianism is a topic we will return to. First, however, it will be convenient to consider developments in each branch of Aristotelian philosophy in turn throughout the period of the five centuries separating Aristotle from Alexander. LOGIC Theophrastus and Eudemus continued and developed the study of formal logic which Aristotle had instituted in the Prior Analytics. There are two areas in which they made a particular contribution. The first is in modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility. Aristotle had utilised a notion of possibility according to which ‘possible’ excludes not only what is impossible but also what is necessary; while this is intuitive (it is not natural to say ‘it is possible that 2+2=4’, for example), it removes the expected parallelism between statements of possibility and statements of fact. For with this type of possibility ‘it is possible that all B are A’ implies ‘it is possible that no B are A’, and ‘it is possible that no B are A’ does not imply ‘it is possible that no A are B’ (for it may be that all B have the possibility of either being A or not being A, but that there are some other A that cannot be B at all). Second, while it may seem natural to suppose that a conclusion cannot be stronger than the weakest of the premisses from which it follows —the ‘weakest-link-in-the-chain’ principle, or, as medieval logicians put it, sequitur conclusio partem deteriorem, ‘the conclusion follows the weaker part’—Aristotle argued that it made a difference which premiss was concerned. For him ‘necessarily all B are A’ and ‘all C are B’ yield ‘necessarily all C are A’, while ‘all B are A’ and ‘necessarily all C are B’ yield only ‘all C are A’ and not ‘necessarily all C are A’. On both these issues Theophrastus and Eudemus, who are regularly cited together in our sources, adopted the opposite view; in both cases the effect is to make modal logic simpler and tidier. Statements of possibility now behave like statements of fact, and the modality of the conclusion in all syllogisms is determined by a simple rule. If Aristotle was influenced in taking the view he did by extra-logical considerations (for example, that being as a matter of fact a member of a group implies possessing necessarily the properties that all members of the group possess necessarily), the changes made by Theophrastus and Eudemus may indicate a move from logic conceived in terms of its applications in the real world to logic as a purely formal system. It is, however, one thing to assert this with hindsight, quite another to claim that Theophrastus and Eudemus would have seen the change in these terms. Theophrastus also developed the study of argument forms mentioned by Aristotle but not fully discussed by him. It seems highly probable that these included the forms of argument with conditional, conjunctive and disjunctive premisses which were to form the basis alike of Stoic logic and of modern propositional logic. But it also seems likely that Theophrastus saw these simply as one among several types of secondary argument form, the categorical syllogism remaining primary, and that he did not anticipate Chrysippus’ development of propositional logic as a comprehensive system.<sup>25</sup> The eventual decline of the Stoic school, and the adoption of Aristotelian texts into the Neoplatonic curriculum, ensured the victory of Peripatetic logic over Stoic logic as the subject of formal study. But the contribution of Aristotelian writers after Theophrastus and Eudemus to the development of logic was not great. The innovations came from writers outside the school, such as Galen (even though it is not true, as once thought, that Galen discovered the fourth figure of the ‘Aristotelian’ syllogism<sup>26</sup>.) Alexander wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works (only those on Prior Analytics 1 and on the Topics now surviving) and a separate monograph, now lost, on Syllogisms with Mixed Premisses (that is, premisses of differing modalities). PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS; FATE AND PROVIDENCE Aristotle defined time as the numbered aspect of motion (Physics 4.11 219b5), indicated most clearly by the movement of the heavenly sphere, though not to be identified with this (Physics 4.14 223b23). Theophrastus and Eudemus followed Aristotle’s view, but Strato rejected it on the grounds that motion and time are continuous whereas number is discrete<sup>27</sup> and defined time as quantity or measure both in motion and in rest, thus giving it an existence independently of motion (fragments 75–9 Wehrli). He was followed in this by Boethus.<sup>28</sup> Alexander explicitly rejected such a theory, and identified time as the number of the motion of the outermost heavenly sphere more definitely than Aristotle himself had done. Where Aristotle had suggested that there could be no time without soul, as without soul there could be no numbering (Physics 4.14 223a21 ff.), Alexander argued that time is in its own nature a unity and is divided by the present moment only in our thought. This suggests that time itself can exist without any actual numbering; and Alexander appears to identify time in this sense with the continuous numerable movement of the outermost heavenly sphere. Characteristically, Alexander’s approach combines a claim to be stating and defending the ‘Aristotelian’ position with a new development and emphasis of his own.<sup>29</sup> Theophrastus assembled a series of difficulties for Aristotle’s definition of place as the innermost unmoved limit of what surrounds a thing (Aristotle Physics 4.4 212a20; Theophrastus fragment 146 FHS and G.) We do not know whether these difficulties led Theophrastus actually to reject the Aristotelian conception of place. The Neoplatonist commentator Simplicius, after outlining the view of place held by his predecessor Damascius, mentions in passing that Theophrastus seems to have anticipated this, interpreting place as the proper position of a part in a complex whole.<sup>30</sup> Strato (fragment 55 Wehrli, cf. fragments 59–60 Wehrli) certainly rejected Aristotle’s view of place, and defined it instead as the interval or extension delimited by the outermost surface of what is contained or the innermost surface of what contains it—which amounts to saying that the place of a thing is, not as for Aristotle what contains it, but the space that it occupies.<sup>31</sup> For Aristotle sublunary things are composed of the four elements, earth, air, fire and water (which can be and are transmuted into each other), while the heavenly spheres are composed of ether, the fifth element, which has the capacity for movement but for no other kind of change; fire and air naturally move upwards, towards the heavens, and earth and water downwards. Steinmetz [5.41] argued that Theophrastus both rejected the fifth element and argued that fire requires a substrate in a way that the other elements do not. It is true that in the opening section of On Fire Theophrastus draws attention to the fact that terrestrial fire needs a constant supply of fuel, which might be thought to conflict with its status as a primary element; and he also speculates over whether the sun, if not actually fire, may not be at least hot.<sup>32</sup> Such thoughts might lead to a world-picture radically different from Aristotle’s—if indeed Aristotle’s own views were consistent throughout.<sup>33</sup> It is not, however, clear how far Theophrastus pursued the implications. For the introductory discussion of On Fire ends inconclusively, and Theophrastus turns to more specific questions, not before pointing out that the need for replenishment applies not just to fire but to all the sublunary elements (On Fire 8). As for the fifth element, Philoponus suggests that Theophrastus (fragment 161A FHS and G) retained it, and the evidence to the contrary is at best dubious.<sup>34</sup> Strato (fragment 84 Wehrli) certainly rejected the fifth element and held that the heavens are composed of fire. He also held that all the elements naturally move to the centre of the universe (fragments 50–2 Wehrli).<sup>35</sup> The fifth element was later rejected also by Xenarchus, a Peripatetic of the time of Augustus.<sup>36</sup> Steinmetz also suggested that Theophrastus emphasised the role of heat, especially that of the sun, in causing physical change, and that he modified the Aristotelian explanation of meteorological phenomena by dry and moist exhalations from the earth and the water on it, reducing the dry one to mere reflection of the heat of the sun. But both Theophrastus’ Meteorology and his treatise On Fire suggest less divergence from Aristotle’s views than Steinmetz supposed.<sup>37</sup> And, once again, there is the question of Aristotle’s own consistency; for Longrigg ([5.67] 216–21), who argues that Theophrastus treated fire as active and the other three elements as passive, finds that both this and Theophrastus’ distinction between the generative heat of the sun and terrestrial fire develop themes already present in Aristotle’s physiological and biological writings, as opposed to his general physical theory. The Stoics rejected a fifth element and gave a major role to fire, and later, with Chrysippus, pneuma, as embodiments of the active principle in the universe; but the presence of similar tendencies in Aristotle’s own successors does not mean that their enterprise of continuing and developing Aristotle’s thought should be seen only as a transition paving the way for Stoicism. Although Theophrastus denied the existence of the Unmoved Mover, he continued to hold, like Aristotle,<sup>38</sup> that the heavens are ensouled (fragments 159, 252 FHS and G). That the heavens are ensouled was later the belief of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and of his teacher Herminus (Simplicius, On the Heaven 380.3 ff.).<sup>39</sup> Aristotle maintained the infinite divisibility of matter and the absence of any void. Scholars have drawn particular attention to contexts where Theophrastus, in the explanation of physical processes, makes use of the notion of passages or pores (notably On Fire 42). There is no inconsistency between this and Aristotelian physical theory, unless we are to suppose that the pores contain vacuum; they may well be thought of rather as containing matter more tenuous than what surrounds them. Strato was certainly prepared to allow the existence of ‘microvoids’ within material bodies (fragment 65a Wehrli).<sup>40</sup> Theophrastus did it seems employ the principle of ‘nature abhorring a vacuum’ in the explanation of winds,<sup>41</sup> but this and the idea of microvoids are not equivalent, as Furley [5.68] 156 ff. points out. Both ideas influenced the Alexandrian physician Erasistratus, who had been a fellow-pupil of Theophrastus with Strato, in his explanations of physiological processes; and the influence of Strato’s theory has also been seen in the technological writer Hero of Alexandria.<sup>42</sup> But all this is still far removed from the Atomist conception of discrete particles of matter moving within an otherwise empty space. A tendency to materialistic explanations can be seen in Theophrastus’ introduction of material effluences into the explanation of odour, which Aristotle had interpreted rather as the propagation of a change in the intervening medium. Even light was explained by some Peripatetics in material terms.<sup>43</sup> On issues of physical theory such as these the Peripatetics of the Roman Empire, concerned as they were to explain the Aristotelian texts, returned to more orthodox Aristotelian positions. (Alexander of Aphrodisias had a particular interest in the theory of vision, inherited from his teacher Sosigenes.) But on other aspects of the organisation of the natural world later Peripatetics found themselves constrained to develop ‘Aristotelian’ positions on issues to which Aristotle himself had devoted little or no direct attention. The Stoics, in particular, had made fate and divine providence central topics of philosophical debate. Aristotle himself had little to say about the former, and his account in Metaphysics A of the Unmoved Mover as engaged in self-contemplation, causing movement as an object of desire without itself being affected, seems to rule out divine providence altogether. The nature of divine involvement with the universe forms the climax of the treatise On the World (De mundo), attributed to Aristotle (and so contained in our standard editions) but probably in fact a composition of the Roman period.<sup>44</sup> In this treatise God is likened to the Persian King, ruling by delegated authority; divine influence is present in the world, but God himself is remote in a way that is appropriate to his dignity. Aristotle himself in Metaphysics 10, arguing that goodness is to be located both in the Unmoved Mover and in the orderliness of the world dependent on it, but more in the former than in the latter, had employed the images of a military commander and the head of a household; these were to play an important part in subsequent discussion, as we shall see. Other interpreters, however, took a harsher line, and the standard view attributed to Aristotle in both pagan and Christian sources—among them Areius Didymus and Diogenes Laertius—is that the heavens are the objects of divine providence while the sublunary region is not. This view may derive originally from Critolaus (fragment 15 Wehrli).<sup>45</sup> The Platonist Atticus (fragment 3 des Places) in the second century AD attacked Aristotle vehemently for holding such a view (and also for denying the immortality of the soul, of which more later); Aristotle’s views, he argued, are really no different from those of Epicurus, but at least Epicurus had the courage of his convictions and denied providence altogether, whereas Aristotle allows its existence but only in a context where it cannot directly benefit us. It was apparently in reply to Atticus that Alexander of Aphrodisias developed an alternative ‘Aristotelian’ theory of providence, preserved partly in his treatise On Providence which survives in two Arabic versions, and partly in various short texts attributed to him. Providence is located in the heavens, he argues, in the sense that it is exercised from the heavens over the sublunary region, which, being subject to coming-to-be and passing-away, is the only part of the universe that actually needs providential care. However, providence extends to the sublunary only in preserving the eternity of natural kinds; there is no involvement of providence in the lives of individuals. Alexander can thus account for the occurrence of misfortunes in the lives of individuals, and also avoid an involvement of the divine in things that would be beneath its dignity— something for which he repeatedly criticises the Stoics.<sup>46</sup> Alexander’s theory of providence is a re-working of authentically Aristotelian materials in a new guise. That the movements of the heavens, and especially the seasonal movements of the sun, preserve the continuity of sublunary coming-to-be and hence of natural kinds is argued by Aristotle himself in the penultimate chapter of his On Coming-to-be and Passing- away, and the eternity of natural kinds had been used as an argument for that of the world by Critolaus (fragment 13 Wehrli).<sup>47</sup> Similarly where fate is concerned Alexander’s position is an adaptation of Aristotelian themes. For Aristotle what is natural applies for the most part but not always; and Alexander, in his treatise On Fate, states that an individual’s fate is their nature or, quoting Heraclitus, their character, which for the most part determines what happens to them, but not always. Alexander may not have been the first to put forward this view; certainly one of the texts attributed to him endeavours to read such a notion of fate back into Aristotle’s own two uses of the adjective ‘fated’, into Theophrastus and into an otherwise unknown Polyzelus.<sup>48</sup> What Alexander’s view of fate emphatically rules out is the Stoic concept of fate as inexorably determining everything. The unity of the universe, he argues, is preserved not by the chain of causes and effects, but by the regular movement of the heavens; as in a household, so in the universe minor variations in matters of detail do not affect the orderliness of the whole (Alexander, On Fate ch. 25). The similarity to Alexander’s theory of providence is apparent; so too is the place in Peripatetic thought of the conception of the universe as a hierarchy in which the same degree of order, goodness and perfection is not to be expected at every level. It is tempting to see the remoteness of God in the De mundo, and Alexander’s attacks on the Stoics for involving God in every detail of the management of the world, as reflecting the increased remoteness of earthly rulers when the Greek city state was replaced first by the Hellenistic monarchies and then by the Roman Empire; but the fact that the hierarchical picture is already implicit in Aristotle Metaphysics 10 itself may argue for caution here. Theophrastus and Strato devoted little attention to problems of general metaphysics such as the nature of universals; indeed, Strato’s materialism is reflected in his emphasising the effect of one element in overcoming another rather than the division into matter and form (Gottschalk [5.58] 150, cf. Brink [5.1] 948). With the revival of Aristotelianism and the placing of the Categories at the beginning of the whole sequence of Aristotle’s works the status of universals became a central issue. Once again, the thinker on whose views we are most fully informed is Alexander, though his views were anticipated by Boethus,<sup>49</sup> and some of the evidence comes from short texts which may not all be by Alexander himself. Definitions, it is argued, are of specific or generic forms; these do not include any of the peculiarities of individuals due to their matter, such as Socrates’ snub nose, and yet are not in themselves universal; the nature of human being would be the same even if only one human being existed. Socrates exists because ‘human being’ exists, and not the other way round; yet ‘human being’ would not exist if no individual human being at all existed. The implication seems to be that each human being has the same nature or form, the form of the species human being, but that my form and yours are the same only in kind (or ‘form’; the Greek is the same), not numerically; or, putting it another way, to speak of ‘the same form’ does not mean that there is a single numerically individual form that you and I share.<sup>50</sup> Alexander’s position has been criticised both in ancient and in modern times for being nominalist and hence un-Aristotelian. Some of those criticisms are, however, from a Platonist standpoint.<sup>51</sup> For Aristotle as well as for Alexander universals have their existence as post rem mental constructs;<sup>52</sup> but it is important that those mental constructs are not arbitrary but reflect the fundamental reality of the specific forms. The latter are the product of the abstracting power of intellect (Alexander, On Soul 90.2–11), but that does not mean that it is up to us which features we abstract. On the contrary, the important thing about every human being is that he or she is a human being, the various accidents due to matter being secondary to this. This explains why texts attributed to Alexander can say that the universal is prior to any particular individual;<sup>53</sup> and, while it may be questionable whether we should use ideas from one area of Alexander’s philosophising to settle an issue in another, the emphasis in his theory of providence on the preservation of the species agrees with an emphasis on the reality of specific form. Lennox [5.175] indeed sees eternity in species through reproduction as the context for understanding what is meant by ‘being one in form’. Alexander has also been regarded as un-Aristotelian in diminishing the role of form in comparison with that of matter. But this is chiefly in the context of his doctrine of soul, to which we should now turn. SOUL Aristotle defined the soul as the form of the living creature. It is thus neither a separable immaterial entity (as Plato had supposed), nor a distinct material ingredient in the whole creature (as Epicurus for example was to argue). But neither is it, for Aristotle, simply a product of the arrangement of the bodily parts, reducible to the latter; body is to be explained in terms of soul, and in general compounds of matter and form are to be explained in terms of the latter. A human body has a certain structure in order to enable the human being to function in the way that human beings do. However, that body is to be explained in terms of soul and not vice versa need not mean that a certain arrangement of bodily parts is not a necessary condition for the existence of a certain type of soul. In the case of perceptive soul the bodily organ that relates to a particular soul-faculty is evident; the eye in the case of sight, the ear in that of hearing. It is less obvious how we are to relate the soul to the body in general—both in terms of how soul and body interact, and in terms of whether some part of the body plays a particularly vital role. Aristotle had seen ‘connate spirit’ (pneuma) as the physical means by which soul operated, and the heart as the particularly vital organ, the first to develop in the embryo. He had also asserted that intellect, alone of the soul-faculties, was not correlated with any particular organ, and had spoken, in the notorious chapter 3.5 of On Soul, of a distinction in intellect between ‘that which makes everything’ and ‘that which becomes everything’, apparently presenting the former, active intellect as imperishable in a way in which the latter, passive intellect was not. The history of subsequent Peripatetic psychology is largely that of attempts to clarify these issues, attempts that were affected to varying extents by contemporary attitudes and the positions of other philosophical schools. It will be convenient first to discuss the nature of the soul as a whole and its relation to the body, and then to consider the question of intellect separately. Among Aristotle’s immediate pupils, Dicaearchus is said (fragments 11– 12 Wehrli) to have regarded the soul as a ‘harmony’ or mixture of the four elements in the body, a view which some reports present as equivalent to denying the existence of the soul at all (fragments 7–8 Wehrli). Annas [5. 160] 31 sees Dicaearchus’ theory of the soul as eliminativist, with the caveat that our sources may be tendentious). Aristoxenus, too, is said (fragments 119–20 Wehrli) to have regarded the soul as a harmony or attunement of the body, simply. It is possible that both writers were prompted by Plato’s attack on the Pythagorean theory of soul as a harmony in the Phaedo (86ad, 92a–94e) and that their interest was chiefly in attacking Plato’s position. We do not know whether they actually presented their interpretations as ‘Aristotelian’. Strato certainly brought some highly pertinent criticisms (fragments 122–7 Wehrli, cf. Gottschalk [5.58] 164 ff.) against Plato’s arguments for immortality in the Phaedo, and was followed in this by Boethus.<sup>55</sup> Even less interest in Aristotle’s theory is shown by Heraclides of Pontus (a pupil both of Aristotle and of Plato’s successor Speusippus; he is a follower of the Academy rather than a Peripatetic, though sometimes treated as such), and by Clearchus, another writer on the fringes of the Peripatetic school; both were interested in ‘outof- the-body’ experiences.<sup>56</sup> Strato emphasised the role of pneuma, ‘breath’ or ‘spirit’, in the functioning of the soul. Aristotle and Theophrastus had used pneuma to explain bodily processes,<sup>57</sup> and for Strato (fragments 119–20 Wehrli) soulactivities were explained by pneuma extending throughout the body from the ‘ruling part’, which he located not in the chest (as both Epicurus and the Stoics did) but in the head, or more precisely in the space between the eyebrows. The term for ‘ruling part’ in our sources (hêgemonikon) is Stoic, but even if Strato did not use this actual word the idea is implied. Tertullian illustrates Strato’s theory with the analogy of air in the various passages of a musical pipe (Strato, fragment 108 Wehrli); the Stoics were to use that of the tentacles of an octopus (SVF 2.836). Strato was influenced here by developments in contemporary medicine and anatomy; Erasistratus investigated the function of the nerves by dissection and argued that they contained ‘psychic’ pneuma extending from the brain. All sensation, Strato held, was felt in the ruling part of the soul, rather than in the bodily extremities (fragments 110–11 Wehrli); all sensation involved thought (fragment 112 Wehrli), and there is no thought not derived from sensation (fragment 74 Wehrli). Some have drawn a contrast between Strato’s views on thought itself and those of Aristotle, emphasising Strato’s empiricism; but the contrast sometimes depends on attributing to Aristotle himself a belief in intuition as a mode of cognition distinct from the senses, and this is at least questionable.<sup>58</sup> Lyco’s successor Ariston of Ceos may have stressed the distinction between rational and irrational soul, against the Stoics,<sup>59</sup> but perhaps in an ethical rather than a psychological context. Critolaus described the soul as made of ether, the fifth element (fragments 17–18 Wehrli; Annas [5.160] 33). It has been suggested that soul itself and ether were more closely linked in Aristotle’s ‘published’ works than in those that survive; but this is questionable.<sup>60</sup> Cicero says that Aristotle identified the soul with ether, but this may reflect a misunderstanding, aided by the familiarity of materialistic theories of soul in other schools, of a reference in Aristotle’s early Eudemus to soul as a fifth incorporeal nature besides the four material elements recognised at that stage.<sup>61</sup> Andronicus defined the soul as the power arising from the mixture of the bodily elements,<sup>62</sup> and was followed in this by Alexander (On Soul 24.21– 3). Alexander has been criticised for interpreting Aristotle in a materialist way, treating soul as form, indeed, but making form secondary to matter.<sup>63</sup> His treatment of soul as the culmination of an analysis which starts from the simple physical elements and builds up through successively more complex structures does suggest that he sees form in general and soul in particular as the product of material arrangement. However, it is not un- Aristotelian to say that a certain bodily arrangement is a necessary condition for the existence of soul.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, Alexander may have intended to defend an authentically Aristotelian position against more materialist interpretations. His view does indeed exclude any personal immortality; but so does Aristotle’s own, with the possible exception of his cryptic remarks about the Active Intellect (see p. 165). Andronicus probably, and Alexander certainly (On Soul 22.7 ff.), compared soul as a principle of movement with the nature of the simple bodies, for example the weight of earth. It was by appeal to this conception of nature (itself Aristotelian enough; Aristotle, Physics 2.1 192b21) that Alexander explained the application to the simple bodies of Aristotle’s claim that everything that moves is moved by something (Aristotle, Physics 8.4 254b24), defending it in a treatise surviving only in Arabic.<sup>65</sup> INTELLECT Discussion of Aristotle’s theory of intellect begins already with Theophrastus, who suggests that the reason that we are not always thinking is because of the mixture of the active intellect with potential intellect and body (Theophrastus fragments 320–1 FHS and G). A further problem was how intellect, which can have no nature of its own if it is to be able to receive all intelligible forms, can ever begin to perform the task of abstraction by which it separates forms from their matter (cf. Theophrastus fragments 307, 309, 316–17 FHS and G). Alexander On Soul 84.24–7 later expresses the point by saying that our intellect, at birth, is not so much like a blank wax tablet as like the blankness of the wax tablet; and Xenarchus suggested, whether seriously or as a reductio ad absurdum, that potential intellect was to be identified with prime matter. It was natural to see Aristotle’s remarks in On Soul 3.5 about an active intellect which ‘makes all things’, contrasted with the passive intellect ‘which becomes all things’, as indicating some solution to this problem. In the treatise On the Generation of Animals, moreover, Aristotle refers, in passing and with no very clear explanation, to intellect, alone of our soul-faculties, as entering into the father’s seed, ‘from outside’ (Aristotle Generation of Animals 2.3 736b27) At some point this was linked with the Active Intellect of On Soul. One of the minor works attributed to Alexander, On Intellect, records—only to criticise in its turn—an answer to the objection that such an intellect could not ‘come from outside’ since, being immaterial, it could not change place at all. The objection and reply follow on a previous section introduced as ‘from Aristoteles’; this is probably to be taken as a reference to its content being an interpretation of Aristotle’s own doctrines, and in any case the identity of the person whose views are reported in this section, and of the originator of the following reply to the objection concerning change of place, are uncertain—the text may be disjointed.<sup>66</sup> The section introduced as ‘from Aristoteles’ explains the role of the Active Intellect. It is not an element in the soul of each individual separately; rather, it is identified with the supreme intelligible, the Unmoved Mover, and acts upon our intellects to develop their potentiality through our thinking of it. The objection concerning movement is then answered by the argument that the Active Intellect is present everywhere throughout the world, but can only produce intelligence in those parts of matter that are suitable—i.e. human beings (and any superior intelligences there may be). To this the author of On Intellect himself replies with objections similar to those which Alexander elsewhere brings against Stoic pantheism, complaining that involvement of the divine in the sublunary world is inconsistent with the divine dignity. Gottschalk [5.77] 1160–2 stresses, however, that the rejected account differs from Stoicism in not regarding its omnipresent intellect as material. The author of On Intellect shares the view that the Active Intellect acts upon our intellects; it does so by our becoming aware of it so that it becomes, as it were, a paradigm of the intelligible for us. The difficulty with this view is that it suggests that God is the first thing we think of, whereas it would be more plausible for awareness of him to be the culmination of our understanding. And in Alexander’s own, certainly authentic On Soul we find two other explanations of the role of the Active Intellect; being the supreme intelligible itself, it must be the cause of other things being intelligible, and it is also the cause of things being intelligible because, as Unmoved Mover, it is the cause of their having being in the first place (Alexander, On Soul 88.24–89.8 and 89.9–19 respectively).<sup>67</sup> Neither explanation, however, indicates how the Active Intellect causes us to have intelligence; they simply provide ingenious grounds for asserting that it does so. Such concentration on solving the immediate problem is typical of Alexander. An explanation would indeed be available if we were to suppose that the divine intellect already contained within itself the thoughts that we can come to apprehend; but that is essentially the position of Plotinus, and while he may be indebted in various respects to Alexander’s account of intellect, there is no indication that Alexander himself took this particular step. It has been debated whether Alexander’s On Soul is an attempt to improve on On Intellect, or the reverse. Both accounts alike, by identifying the Active Intellect with God rather than with a part of the individual’s soul, deny personal immortality. Since thought, for Alexander as for Aristotle, is identical in form with its objects, and the Unmoved Mover is pure form without matter, our minds in a sense become the Unmoved Mover while they think of it, and can thus achieve a sort of temporary immortality; but that is all (On Soul 90.11–91.6).<sup>68</sup> Whether this claim is to be seen in mystical terms, or whether it is simply the by-product of Alexander’s undoubted ingenuity in attempting to clarify Aristotelian doctrine, is debatable. It is also questionable as exegesis of Aristotle; Aquinas was later to argue, against Alexander and Averroes, that Aristotle had intended the Active Intellect to be a personal element in each individual’s soul and had thus intended a personal immortality. ETHICS, POLITICS, RHETORIC Throughout our period Peripatetic ethics are characterised by a contrast with the paradoxical extremes of Stoicism. Cicero repeatedly portrays Theophrastus as weakening virtue by recognising external goods, subject to fortune, as necessary for happiness (Theophrastus fragments 493, 497–9 FHS and G; so too Ariston of Ceos, cf. Wehrli [5.60] 580). Theophrastus’ position is not that far removed from some aspects of Aristotle’s; the latter had after all said that to call someone being tortured happy is absurd (Nicomachean Ethics 7.13 1153b19; cf. Cicero Tusculan Disputations 5.24, and Fortenbaugh [5.30] 218–23). Lyco is attacked by Cicero (Tusculan Disputations 3.77= Lyco fragment 19 Wehrli; cf. 3.76) for seeking to reduce distress by arguing that it is caused by disadvantages of fortune and of the body, not by evil in the soul. The claim that happiness involves all three classes of goods, of the soul, of the body, and external, is attributed to Critolaus (fragments 19–20 Wehrli), though he also argued that if those of the soul were placed on one side of a balance and bodily and external goods on the other, the former would far outweigh the latter (fragments 21–2 Wehrli). Areius Didymus (cited by Stobaeus Ecl. 2.7.3b p. 46.10–17 Wachsmuth), however, seeking to reconcile Peripatetic and Stoic ethics, explicitly rejects Critolaus’ view, which he interprets as making all three types of goods parts of human excellence; this is also the view attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius (5.30; Moraux [5.87] 276). For Areius bodily and external goods are rather used by virtuous activity; a similar view is later held by Aspasius (On the Nicomachean Ethics 24.3 ff.<sup>69</sup> Areius holds that there is no happiness without external goods as well as virtue; however, while lack of external goods does not necessarily lead to actual unhappiness, lack of virtue always does.<sup>70</sup> Opposition to extreme Stoic ethical views played a part in the renewed interest in Aristotelianism on a popular level in the Imperial period. It is particularly notable in the treatment of pathos or ‘emotion’, which Aristotle had regarded as fundamental to ethics. The Stoics confined the term to emotional reactions that went beyond right reason, and therefore regarded pathê as such as uniformly bad (though also recognising a class of ‘good feelings’, eupatheiai, such as ‘watchfulness’ by contrast with fear; Critolaus rejected this distinction, fragment 24 Wehrli, cf. Wehrli [5.57] vol. 10 p. 69 and [5.60] 588). The Peripatetics characteristically recommended not the absence of passions, apatheia, but metriopatheia, moderation in the passions; as Aristotle himself had taught, failure to show anger when anger is due is a shortcoming (Nicomachean Ethics 2.7 1108a8; cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.31; Philodemus, On Anger XXXI.31–9 Wilke; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.43–4; Aspasius On the Nicomachean Ethics 44.12–19; Moraux [5.75] 282 n. 197, [5.87] 278). According to Areius Didymus (Stobaeus Ecl. 2.7.1, 38.18–24 Wachsmuth), Aristotle regarded pathos not as an excessive movement of the soul but as an irrational movement liable to excess. Andronicus and Boethus too defined it as a movement of an irrational part of the soul (Aspasius, On the Nicomachean Ethics 44.20 ff.); but Andronicus shared with the Stoics the view that all pathos involves a supposition that something is good or bad, and Boethus held that it was a movement possessing a certain magnitude. Aspasius rejected both these points, distancing the Peripatetic position further from the Stoic one (Aspasius, On the Nicomachean Ethics 42.13 ff.). Aspasius’ role in the development of Aristotelian ethics as a subject of study has been a topic of recent debate. His commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics includes the ‘common books’ which are transmitted both as part of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Eudemian (Nicomachean Ethics 5–7=Eudemian 4−6). It is from the time of Aspasius that the Nicomachean Ethics rather than the Eudemian is the work regularly studied and cited (as in the Ethical Problems attributed to Alexander, for example). Perhaps it was Aspasius who was responsible for the placing of the ‘common books’ in their Nicomachean context, but this seems more questionable.<sup>71</sup> The Stoics based their ethics on the ‘appropriation’ (oikeiôsis) or recognition by living creatures of their own selves. The most fundamental impulse was that to self-preservation, which developed in two ways in human beings as they grew older, firstly by the person coming to recognise virtue and reason as true self-interest, and secondly by the recognition of other people as akin to oneself. Attempts have been made to trace the origin of this Stoic doctrine to the post-Aristotelian Peripatos.<sup>72</sup> It was indeed attributed to Aristotle by Areius Didymus (ap. Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.17.3, 116.21– 128.9 Wachsmuth),<sup>73</sup> Boethus and Xenarchus (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement to the book On the Soul (De anima libri mantissa) 151.3–13), but this may simply reflect Stoic influence and, in the case of Areius at least, a desire to assimilate Stoic and Aristotelian thought to one another.<sup>74</sup> Theophrastus spoke of ‘affinity’ (oikeiotês) between all human beings and animals (fragment 531 FHS and G; cf. fragment 584A FHS and G), but this is hardly the same as the process of ‘appropriation’ described by the Stoics. Some have argued that the account of moral development in terms of ‘appropriation’ at Cicero, On Ends 5.24–70 derives from Theophrastus, even though the book as a whole represents the views of the syncretising Antiochus of Ascalon,<sup>75</sup> but this is at best open to debate. Dicaearchus in his Tripoliticus (fragments 70–1 Wehrli) set out the doctrine of the mixed constitution, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy superior to each of these. The concept was already present, applied to Sparta, in Plato (Laws 4.712d) and Aristotle (Politics 2.6 1265b33);<sup>76</sup> it was later to be applied to Rome by Polybius (6.11.11) and Cicero (Republic 1.69–70, 2.65) and appears in Areius Didymus (ap. Stobaeus Ecl. 2.7.26, p. 151.1 Wachsmuth). Cicero presents Dicaearchus and Theophrastus as advocates of the active and contemplative lives respectively, continuing a debate already present in Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10.7–8 (Dicaearchus fragment 25 Wehrli, Theophrastus fragment 481 FHS and G). Theophrastus developed Aristotle’s study of rhetoric, elaborating from Aristotelian materials a doctrine of the four virtues of style (correctness, clarity, appropriateness, and ornament) which became standard for later writers, and dealing with rhetorical delivery, a subject Aristotle had neglected. Theophrastus’ Characters may well relate to the rhetorical portrayal of character as much as to comic drama or the study of ethics; these purposes are not indeed mutually exclusive. Subsequently, however, the study of rhetoric became a subject in its own right and grew apart from Peripatetic philosophy.<sup>77</sup> CONCLUSION The history of Aristotelianism as a separate tradition in the ancient world comes to an end with Alexander and Themistius. Part of the reason for Alexander’s having no distinguished followers in his own school is undoubtedly the decline in interest in formal higher education in the third century by contrast with the second. But that does not on its own explain why Aristotelianism declined where Platonism did not. Once again, as in the third century BC, the lack of a distinctive doctrinal appeal may have played a part; where Platonism had a radical and distinctive message, Aristotelianism appealed to scholars and, on a different level, to common sense. The difference was that, where Aristotelianism in the Hellenistic period lacked a distinctive identity except in so far as the pursuit of enquiry itself provided one, the revived Aristotelianism of the Empire was limited in its scope by being too closely tied to the exposition of the Aristotelian texts. More might indeed have been made of those texts and their implications; but if Alexander had developed his ideas concerning intellect further, he would, as already indicated, have been adopting a position not unlike that of the Neoplatonists themselves. Merlan ([5.2] 122–3 n.4) and Movia ([5.128] 63–81) both assess Alexander in terms of a tension between naturalism and mysticism. Merlan goes further, suggesting that the whole history of the Peripatetic tradition in antiquity can be seen in terms of an uneasy oscillation between a materialism insufficiently distinct from Stoicism, on the one hand, and a belief in immaterial principles insufficiently distinct from Platonism, on the other; the school declined because it lacked a distinctive enough position of its own (Merlan [5.2] 122. Merlan’s perspective is indeed explicitly Platonist; but it was after all Platonism that eventually prevailed). In another sense, however, the decline of Aristotelianism was only apparent. The continued study of Aristotle’s writings was a fundamental part of the Neoplatonist curriculum, and Greek philosophy passed to the Islamic world in a form which combined Platonic and Aristotelian elements. It was the latter which, in a new guise indeed, became central to the philosophies of Avicenna, Averroes, Aquinas and many others. But to tell that story now would take more space than we have already used. NOTES 1 It will be immediately apparent how much the following account owes to the writings of others, and in particular to those of Paul Moraux and of Hans Gottschalk. Important too is the survey of Peripatetic writers from Theophrastus to Nicolaus of Damascus in Wehrli [5.60]. I am particularly grateful to Fred Schroeder for his permission to refer to work in progress at the time of writing. Numbered references in [brackets] are to the bibliography; for fragments of Peripatetic writers, Wehrli=[5.60] and FHS and G=[5.25]. 2 Theophrastus, Explanations of Plants 1.9.1, 1.16.12, 1.18.2. Cf. Einarson and Link [5.6] vol. 1, xvii–xviii. I am grateful to Geoffrey Lloyd for emphasising the importance of this to me. 3 Cf. Pellegrin [5.184]; Lennox [5.176]. 4 See Steinmetz [5.41] 334–51; Gottschalk [5.42] 20; Mansfeld [5.153], [5. 179] and [5.180] especially 67–70. 5 See Annas [5.160] 26–8. 6 Plutarch, Against Colotes 14 1114F=Strato fragment 35 Wehrli; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.35=Strato fragment 33 Wehrli; cf. Academica Posteriora 1.121=Strato fragment 32 Wehrli. Repici [5.62] 117–56; on the other side, van Raalte [5.51] 203. 7 Cf. Devereux [5.49], especially at 182. Balme [5.53] similarly argues that Theophrastus’ views on spontaneous animal generation antedate Aristotle’s own latest views. 8 So, recently, Isnardi-Parente [5.173] 125–8 and Marenghi [5.69] 9–11, 33–6. 9 This is not to deny that both these schools showed philosophical acumen and subtlety; the loss of interest in Aristotle was not a loss of interest in philosophical argument as such. 10 Strabo 13.1.54; cf. Plutarch Life of Sulla 26.1–3 and, for Andronicus, also Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 24. I use ‘published’ and ‘unpublished’ as equivalents for the traditional ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ respectively; the latter, in particular, could have misleading connotations. That Andronicus produced a definitive edition in the sense of a standard text, as opposed to a standard arrangement of works, has been called into question by Barnes in [5.79] and in his contribution to [5.98]. Against Düring’s claim that Andronicus produced his collection in Rome cf. Gottschalk [5.77] 1093. 11 Gottschalk [5.77] 1088, 1098 11.96, and 1173. Cf., for the second century AD in particular, Ebbesen [5.165] vol. 1, 54–6. 12 Moraux [5.87] 248–9. Cf. also Athenaeus 1.4 3ab with Gottschalk [5.77] 1084–6, who suggests that the books inherited by Neleus may never have left Athens and (speculatively) that Apellicon may have stolen the books and made up the whole story to conceal the fact. 13 Ed. H.Mutschmann, Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. Translation and commentary in Rossitto [5.90]. 14 On which see Moraux [5.87], emphasising Diogenes’ use of a Hellenistic source which, he suggests, impressed him because of its antiquity. 15 Cf. also Gottschalk [5.77] 1129–31, on the classifications in the pseudo- Aristotelian treatise On Virtues and Vices and the adaptation of this, combined with Stoic material, in the work On Passions falsely attributed to Andronicus himself. 16 On Nicolaus see Moraux [5.74] 445–514; Gottschalk [5.77] 1122–5. On the treatise On Plants in particular Moraux [5.74] 487–9, with bibliography, and Drossaart-Lulofs and Poortman [5.86]. For the reception of the work in the Renaissance, cf. Schmitt [5.185] 299–300, 307–8. 17 On Areius see Moraux [5.74] 259–444; Fortenbaugh [5.82]; Gottschalk [5. 77] 1125–9; Hahm [5.83]. For the historical evidence for his personal relationship with Augustus see Hahm [5.83] 3035–8. The identity of the author of our texts with the friend of Augustus has recently been called into question by Göransson [5.167]. 18 On Boethus see Moraux [5.74] 143–79. 19 In [5.94]; cf. Gottschalk [5.77] 1155, against Kenny [5.95] 37 11.3, who attributed the whole commentary to Adrastus. On Adrastus generally cf. Moraux [5.75] 294–322. 20 So Lynch [5.3] 161–2, 200–7. Gottschalk [5.77] 1093–4, however, argues that the school continued to exist in some sense at least for the rest of the first century BC, and that Andronicus was its head. 21 Gottschalk [5.77] 1159–60 notes the same tendency in Alexander’s teacher Sosigenes, and suggests it may have been a didactic technique. Cf. Moraux [5. 137] 169 n. 1; Sharples [5.131] 97. 22 Schroeder [5.117]. Cf. also, on Quaestio 1.11, Sharples [5.119] 50 n. 126. 23 There is a convenient list of the published commentaries in Sorabji [5.78] 27– 30. 24 Damascius ap. Suda s.v. Doros (no. 1476, vol. 2 p. 137.3–15 Adler). Dorus is also mentioned in Damascius’ Life of Isidorus, 131. Cf. Brink [5.1] 947. 25 So Barnes [5.40]; cf. Ebert [5.166] 15–19, arguing against Barnes that there is no evidence for Theophrastus using variables to represent propositions rather than terms, as the Stoics did. On Theophrastus’ logic in general cf. Kneale and Kneale [5.174] 100–12. 26 Cf. Kneale and Kneale [5.174] 183–4; Gottschalk [5.77] 1171. 27 Simplicius On the Physics 788.34 ff.=Theophrastus fragment 151B FHS and G =Eudemus fragment 91 Wehrli=Strato fragment 75 Wehrli. 28 Simplicius On the Categories 434.2 ff., cf. Gottschalk [5.77] 1108. 29 Cf. Sharples [5.139] and Gottschalk [5.77] 1168. 30 Theophrastus fragment 149 FHS and G. Cf. Sorabji [5.44] and [5.186] 158, 202–15; Algra [5.45]; [5.25] commentary volume 3.1, 54–60. 31 Cf. Gottschalk [5.58] 169; Sorabji [5.186] 158. 32 Cf. on this [5.25] commentary volume 3.1, 89–90, 115–16; Battegazzore [5. 43]. 33 Cf., on the question of the fifth element, Furley [5.68] 193–5. 34 On Theophrastus fragment 232 FHS and G—a report of Xenophanes’ views, not of Theophrastus’ own as Steinmetz and others have supposed—see most recently Runia [5.47]. 35 Furley [5.68] 159. Theophrastus at On Winds 22 already seems to imply that air naturally moves downwards, Longrigg [5.67] 221. 36 Gottschalk [5.77] 1119. On Xenarchus see Moraux [5.74] 197–214. 37 As Gottschalk ([5.42] 24) has pointed out. 38 Cf. Guthrie [5.170] xxix–xxxvi. 39 Zeller regarded this as un-Aristotelian in Herminus and Alexander, and Gottschalk ([5.77] 1159) describes it as startling; but if it is so it is as a return to Aristotelian orthodoxy. 40 Gatzemeier [5.66] 94–7 argued that no more than a theory of potential void was to be attributed to Strato; but cf. Furley [5.68] 151–3, Algra [5.159] 58– 69, and, against Gottschalk’s attribution of a belief in actual void to Theophrastus, Furley [5.68] 141–3. 41 Steinmetz [5.41] 30; and see now Daiber [5.14] 279, 283 and Kidd [5.46] 303, against Gottschalk [5.42] 24 and [5.58] 159 ff., who regarded the relevant section of Theophrastus’ Meteorology (13.13–17 and 13.50, pp. 28– 9 in Daiber [5.14]) as contaminated by Strato’s views. 42 Cf. Furley [5.68] loc. cit., and references there. 43 Cf. Gottschalk [5.58] 155, [5.65] 76. 44 Cf. Moraux [5.75] 1–82, Gottschalk [5.77] 1132–9. Reale [5.89] claimed that the De mundo is a genuine early work of Aristotle himself, but this has not found general acceptance. 45 Cf. Moraux [5.87] 282 and Gottschalk [5.77] 1126 and n. 237; Mueller [5. 182] 155 n. 42 is, however, more doubtful. 46 See further Sharples [5.127] 1216–18, and references there. 47 Moraux [5.141] 199–202, before the Arabic text of On Providence was known, criticised Alexander’s theory of providence for being ‘mechanistic’; in fact the Arabic text makes it clear that Alexander does want to assert that the divine is aware of its beneficial effects on the sublunary, though how he reconciled this with Metaphysics A we do not know. 48 Cf. Donini [5.129] 159–61 and [5.151] 182; Sharples [5.127] 1218–19 and references there. 49 Cf. Lloyd [5.144] 52, Gottschalk [5.77] 1109. 50 The first way of putting it suggests a doctrine of individual forms (not, of course, in the sense that each person’s form will include individual peculiarities); the second, that a form is the sort of thing to which questions of numerical identity or difference do not apply. Cf. Lloyd [5.144] 49 ff., especially 54, and Lennox [5.175] 77–8. (But Lennox goes further, arguing that we should not speak of ‘the same form’, or of your form and mine being the same in form, at all; it is compounds of form and matter that are or are not the same as each other. Ibid. 88–9.) The question whether or not Aristotle believed in ‘individual forms’, and if so in what sense, has been a major topic of contemporary debate; cf., recently, Halper [5.171] 227–55. 51 Simplicius, On the Categories 82.22; Dexippus, On the Categories 45.12. Cf. Sharples [5.127] 1199, and references there. 52 Lloyd [5.144] 2 ff., 49 ff., though noting expressions in Alexander which could encourage what he calls ‘back door Platonism’. 53 Cf. Sharples [5.127] 1201 against Lloyd [5.144] 51, but also [5.122] 50 11. 126. 54 So Annas [5.160] 30–1. See also Gottschalk [5.168]. 55 Gottschalk [5.77] 1117–19. 56 Cf. Annas [5.160] 30–2. The testimonia to both writers are included in Wehrli [5.57]. Cf. also Gottschalk [5.61] 98–108. 57 Cf. Solmsen [5.70] 560–3, 567–8, arguing that in Aristotle the theory is in the early stages of its development and that there is no indication of channels through which pneuma passes in the body; with a rather different emphasis, linking pneuma with the blood in the blood-vessels, Peck [5.183] 593. Cf. also Verbeke [5.188] 198, Annas [5.160] 18–19, and Longrigg [5. 178] 173–4. There is, however, no hint in either Aristotle or Theophrastus of the distinctive position of Praxagoras and Erasistratus (below) that the arteries normally contain only air, the veins blood. 58 Cf. Barnes [5.163] 256–7. On Strato’s psychology cf. further Gottschalk [5. 58] 164 and Annas [5.160] 28–9. At 33 Annas describes him as the only member of the Hellenistic Lyceum with interesting views on the soul. 59 This depends on whether a report at Porphyry ap. Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.24 p. 347.21 Wachsmuth is to be assigned to him, as it is by Movia [5.181] 150–5, Ioppolo [5.182] 272–8 and Annas [5.160] 33, but not by Wehrli [5.57] vol. 6, or to the Stoic Ariston of Chios (=SVF 1.377). 60 Cf. Gottschalk [5.61] 106–7. 61 So Easterling [5.64]; see also Moraux [5.63] 1206, 1229–30, and Theophrastus fragment 269 FHS and G. 62 Galen, Quod animi mores 44.18 Müller. Cf. Moraux [5.74] 132–4, Gottschalk [5.77] 1113. Galen himself argues for it being the mixture, simply. 63 Moraux [5.141] 29–62, comparing Alexander here with Strato; Robinson [5. 145], especially 214–18. See Sharples [5.127] 1203 and references there; also my reply to Robinson at Classical Review 43 (1993) 87–8. 64 Gottschalk [5.77] 1114, while stressing the similarity of Alexander’s position to that of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, notes the affinity of Dicaearchus’ view with Aristotle’s own position—though his source for this is the Platonist Atticus, whose intentions are hostile. 65 See Pines [5.136], and for a full translation of the text Rescher and Marmura [5.138]. Alexander’s view is seen by Pines as an ancestor of the impetus theory used by Philoponus to explain the forced motion of projectiles and passed on to medieval science; where projectiles are concerned Alexander himself holds the orthodox Aristotelian view that their movement is caused by the transmission of movement through the air behind them. 66 Moraux [5.99] interpreted the remark as a reference to Alexander’s teacher Aristoteles of Mytilene, arguing that the doctrines in On Intellect are not in fact contained in the works of Aristotle (the Stagirite). That does not mean that the ingenious might not have found them there; that the reference is after all to the Stagirite has been re-asserted against Moraux by Thillet [5.123] xv– xix and Schroeder and Todd [5.116] 22–31. Accattino and Donini in [5.115] xxvii n. 77 side with Moraux. I am grateful in particular to Jan Opsomer for illuminating discussion of this passage, to be developed more fully elsewhere. The identification of the person referred to does not affect the fact that an identification of the Active Intellect and the ‘intellect from outside’ was asserted by someone early enough to be criticised, and defended, before the work On Intellect attributed to Alexander criticised the defence in its turn. However, Schroeder [5.117] has raised doubts not only about the attribution of On Intellect to Alexander (which has long been debated; cf. Sharples [5. 127] 1211–14) but also about its date (see above, n. 22). 67 On the first argument cf. Lloyd [5.177] 150, defending it against Moraux [5. 141] 90–2 who criticises it as based on Platonist rather than Aristotelian suppositions. The second argument will apply more easily to things subject to coming-to-be and passing-away than to those that are eternal. Cf. Sharples [5. 127] 1206–8 and nn. 68 In the sixteenth century Nicoletto Vernia argued that Alexander did believe in personal immortality, but this is a misinterpretation; cf. Mahoney [5.142]. 69 Cf. Moraux [5.87] 276; Gottschalk [5.77] 1127; Hahm [5.83] 2981, 3010. 70 For an assessment of Areius’ position as an interpretation of Aristotle, and a favourable comparison in this regard with Antiochus of Ascalon, see Annas [5.161] 415–25. 71 Cf. Kenny [5.95] and Gottschalk [5.77] 1101, 1158. 72 Cf. Brink [5.55], Gottschalk [5.77] 1117, 1127–8, and the references they provide. 73 Cf. Görgemanns in [5.82] and Hahm [5.83] 2991, 2998–3000. 74 Cf. Hahm [5.83] 3001–11, and, for a comparison between Areius’ account of oikeiôsis and Aristotle’s theory of friendship, Annas [5.161] 279–87. 75 Cf. Gigon [5.56]; Magnaldi [5.84]. 76 Also of Athens under Solon, Aristotle, Politics 2.12 1273b38. 77 This process is traced in Fortenbaugh and Mirhady [5.71]. BIBLIOGRAPHY This bibliography combines (i) an attempt to survey the most important literature in the field and (ii) references to all works that there has been occasion to cite in the course of the discussion. GENERAL SURVEYS 5.1  C.O.Brink, ‘Peripatos’, in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der Altertumswissenchaft, suppl. 7 (1940) 899–949. 5.2  P.Merlan, ‘The Peripatos’, in A.H.Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, 107–23. 5.3  J.P.Lynch, Aristotle’s School, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972. THEOPHRASTUS: TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS; SURVIVING WORKS Researches on Plants (Historia plantarum) 5.4  A.Hort, Theophrastus: Enquiry into Plants, London Cambridge, Mass., Heinemann/Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1916–26. Greek text, annotated English translation. Also includes On Odours and the spurious On Weather-Signs. 5.5  S.Amigues, Théophraste: Recherches sur les plantes, Paris, Budé, 4 volumes, 1988–, in progress). (Greek text, French translation, commentary.) Explanations of Plants (De causis plantarum) 5.6  B.Einarson and G.K.K.Link, Theophrastus: De causis plantarum, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 1 1976, vols. 2 and 3 1990. (Greek text, annotated English translation.) On the Senses 5.7  in H.Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, Reimer, 1879, 497–527. (Greek text.) 5.8  G.M.Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle, London/New York, Allen and Unwin/Macmillan, 1917. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) On Stones 5.9  E.R.Caley and J.C.Richards, Theophrastus On Stones, Columbus, Ohio University, 1956. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) 5.10  D.E.Eichholz, Theophrastus: De lapidibus, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) On Fire 5.11  V.Coutant, Theophrastus: De Igne, Assen, Vangorcum, 1971. (Greek text, translation, commentary.) On Odours See [5.4] above; also 5.12  U.Eigler and G.Wöhrle, eds, Theophrastus: De odoribus, Leipzig and Stuttgart, Teubner, 1993. (Greek text, German translation, commentary.) On Winds 5.13  V.Coutant and V.Eichenlaub, Theophrastus: De ventis, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) Meteorology (preserved only in Syriac and Arabic) 5.14  H.Daiber, ‘The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic translation’, in [5.37] 166–293. (Arabic and Syriac texts, English translation, commentary.) Metaphysics 5.15  W.D.Ross and F.H.Fobes, Theophrastus: Metaphysics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1929. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) 5.16  M.van Raalte, Theophrastus: Metaphysics, Leiden, Brill, 1993. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) 5.17  A.Laks and G.Most. Paris, Budé, 1993. (Greek text, annotated French translation.) On Fish 5.18  R.W.Sharples, ‘Theophrastus: On Fish’, in [5.37] 347–85. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) Characters 5.19  R.G.Ussher, The Characters of Theophrastus, London, Macmillan, 1960. (Greek text, commentary.) 5.20  P.Steinmetz, Theophrast: Charaktere, Munich, Max Hueber, 1960–2. (Greek text, commentary.) 5.21  J.Rusten, Theophrastus, Characters, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library; with Herodas and Cercidas), 1992. (Greek text, English translation.) Minor works For other surviving minor works (On Sweats, On Giddiness, On (Types of) Fatigue) 5.22  a new edition to be published by Brill is in preparation by W.W. Fortenbaugh, R.W.Sharples and M.Sollenberger, but meanwhile reference must still be made to 5.23  F.Wimmer, Theophrasti Eresii opera, vol. 3, Leipzig, Teubner, 1854–62, or to 5.24 ——Theophrasti Eresii opera, Paris, Didot, 1866, reprinted 1964. THEOPHRASTUS: COLLECTIONS OF FRAGMENTS AND TESTIMONIA In general 5.25  W.W.Fortenbaugh, P.M.Huby, R.W.Sharples (Greek and Latin) and D. Gutas (Arabic), eds, Theophrastus of Eresus, Leiden, Brill, 1992. (Greek/ Latin/Arabic text and English translation; commentary vol. 3. 1, R.W.Sharples, Sources on Physics, with contributions on the Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas, 1998; vol.5, R.W.Sharples, Sources on Biology, 1995; others forthcoming.) Fragments on particular topics Logic 5.26  A.Graeser, Die logischen Fragmente des Theophrast, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1973. (Greek text, commentary.) 5.27  L.Repici, La logica di Teofrasto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1977. (Greek text, Italian translation, commentary.) Physical doxography 5.28  Diels ([5.7]) 473–95. (Greek texts.) Intellect 5.29  E.Barbotin, La Théorie aristotélicienne de l’intellect d’après Théophraste, Louvain, Publications Universitaires, 1954. (Greek text, French translation, commentary.) Ethics 5.30  W.W.Fortenbaugh, Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1984. (Greek text, commentary.) Piety 5.31  W.Pötscher, Theophrastos Peri Eusebeias, Leiden, Brill, 1964. (Greek text, German translation, commentary.) Laws 5.32  A.Szegedy-Maszak, The Nomoi of Theophrastus, New York, Arno, 1981. (Greek text, commentary.) THEOPHRASTUS: STUDIES General Fundamental are: 5.33  O.Regenbogen, ‘Theophrastos’, in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der Altertumswissenchaft, suppl. 7 (1940) 1354–562. 5.34  F.Wehrli in [5.187] 474–522. Numerous papers on various aspects of Theophrastus’ work in: 5.35  W.W.Fortenbaugh, P.M.Huby and A.A.Long, eds, Theophrastus of Eresus: On his Life and Work (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 2), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1985. 5.36  W.W.Fortenbaugh and R.W.Sharples, eds, Theophrastean Studies (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 3), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1988. 5.37  W.W.Fortenbaugh and D.Gutas, eds, Theophrastus: His Physical, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 5), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1992. 5.38  Jan van Ophuisjen and Marlein van Raalte, eds, Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 8), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1998. Logic 5.39  I-M.Bochénski, La Logique de Théophraste, Fribourg en Suisse, Librairie de l’Université, 1947. 5.40  J.Barnes, ‘Theophrastus and hypothetical syllogistic’, in [5.189] 557–76, and in [5.35] 125–41. Physics 5.41  P.Steinmetz, Die Physik des Theophrast (Palingenesia, 1), Bad Homburg, Max Gehlen, 1964. 5.42  H.B.Gottschalk, Review of [5.41], in Gnomon 39 (1967) 17–26. 5.43  A.M.Battegazzore, ‘Spigolature filologiche e note esegetiche al De igne Teofrasteo’, Sandalion 10–11 (1987–8) 49–66. 5.44  R.Sorabji, ‘Theophrastus on Place’, in [5.36] 139–66. 5.45  K.Algra, ‘Place in Context’, in [5.37] 141–65. 5.46  I.G.Kidd, ‘Theophrastus’ Meteorology, Aristotle and Posidonius’, in [5.37] 294–306. 5.47  D.T.Runia, ‘Xenophanes or Theophrastus’, in [5.37] 112–40. Doxography 5.48  J.B.McDiarmid, ‘Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 61 (1953) 85–156. 5.49  D.T.Devereux, ‘The relation between Theophrastus’ Metaphysics and Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda’, in [5.36] 167–88. 5.50  A.Laks, G.W.Most and E.Rudolph, ‘Four notes on Theophrastus’ Metaphysics’, in [5.36] 224–56. 5.51  M.van Raalte, ‘The idea of the cosmos as an organic whole in Theophrastus’ Metaphysics’, in [5.36] 189–215. Biology 5.52  G.Senn, Die Pflanzenkunde des Theophrast von Eresos, ed. O.Gigon, Basel, Universität, 1956. 5.53  D.M.Balme, ‘Development of biology in Aristotle and Theophrastus: theory of spontaneous generation’, Phronesis 7 (1962) 91–104. 5.54  G.Wöhrle, Theophrasts Methode in seinen botanischen Schriften, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1985. Ethics 5.55  C.O.Brink, ‘Oikeiôsis and Oikeiotês; Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory’, Phronesis 1 (1956) 123–45. 5.56  O.Gigon, ‘The Peripatos in Cicero’s De finibus’, in [5.36] 259–71. OTHER PERIPATETICS OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD Texts 5.57  Wehrli, F., Die Schule des Aristoteles, Basel, Schwabe, 2nd edn, 1967–78. (Greek texts, German commentary.) supplemented, for Strato, by 5.58  H.B.Gottschalk, ‘Strato of Lampsacus: some texts’, Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Literary and Historical Section, 11. 6 (1965) 95–182. 5.59  A series of texts, English translations and discussions will appear in Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities; the first on Dicaearchus and Demetrius of Phalerum (Rutgers Studies 9 and 10, ed. W.W.Fortenbaugh et al.), the next on Eudemus. Studies: general A survey of the whole period in 5.60  F.Wehrli, ‘Der Peripatos bis zum Beginn der römischen Kaiserzeit’, in [5. 187] 459–599. On specific writers: 5.61  H.B.Gottschalk, Heraclides of Pontus, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980. 5.62  L.Repici, La natura, e l’anima,: saggi su Stratone di Lampsaco, Torino, Tirrenia, 1988. Metaphysics Studies: particular topics Physics 5.63  P.Moraux, ‘Quinta essentia’, in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der Altertumswissenchaft, 24.1 (1963) 1171–263. 5.64  H.J.Easterling, ‘Quinta natura’, Museum Helveticum 21 (1964) 73–85. 5.65  H.B.Gottschalk, ‘The De coloribus and its author’, Hermes 92 (1964) 59– 85. 5.66  M.Gatzemeier, Die Naturphilosophie des Straton von Lampsakos, Meisenheim am Glan, Anton Hain, 1970. 5.67  J.Longrigg, ‘Elementary physics in the Lyceum and Stoa’, Isis 66 (1975) 211–29. 5.68  D.J.Furley, Cosmic Problems, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 5.69  G.Marenghi, [Aristotele]: Profumi e miasmi, Naples, Arte Tipografica, 1991. Biology 5.70  F.Solmsen, ‘Greek philosophy and the discovery of the nerves’, Museum Helveticum 18 (1961) 169–97, reprinted in id., Kleine Schriften vol. 1, Hildesheim, Olms, 1968, 536–82. Rhetoric 5.71  W.W.Fortenbaugh and D.C.Mirhady, eds, Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 6), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1994. Aristotelian bibliography and the transmission and editing of his works 5.72  P.Moraux, Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d’Aristote, Louvain, Éditions universitaires, 1951. 5.73  I.Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, Göteborg/ Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1957. PERIPATETICS OF THE ROMAN PERIOD General There is a very full survey in 5.74  P.Moraux Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. 1, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1973. 5.75 ——vol. 2, 1984. 5.76 ——vol. 3, ed. J.Wiesner, forthcoming. A shorter survey in 5.77  H.B.Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman world’, in H. Temporini and W.Haase, eds, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol. II.36.2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987, 1079–174. See also 5.78  R.Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London, Duckworth, 1990. Andronicus 5.79  J.Barnes, ‘Roman Aristotle’, in J.Barnes and M.Griffin, eds, Philosophia Togata II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, 1–69. Arius Didymus 5.80  Fragments of the physical epitome in [5.7] 447–72. 5.81  Text of the ethical epitome in Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7 (vol. 2 pp. 37–152 in C. Wachsmuth, ed., Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii duo libri priores, Berlin, Weidemann, 1884). Studies 5.82  W.W.Fortenbaugh, ed., On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus (Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities, 1), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1983. 5.83  D.E.Hahm, ‘The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus’, in H.Temporini and W.Haase, eds, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol. II.36.4, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1990, 2935–3055. 5.84  G.Magnaldi, L’oikeiôsis peripatetica in Ario Didimo e nel ‘De finibus’ di Cicerone, Florence, Le Lettere, 1991. Nicolaus of Damascus Texts in 5.85  H.J.Drossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus of Damascus on the Philosophy of Aristotle, Leiden, Brill, 1965. (Syriac text, English translation and commentary of fragments of books 1–5 of Nicolaus’ compendium.) 5.86  H.J.Drossaart Lulofs and E.J.Poortman, Nicolaus of Damascus ‘De plantis’; Five translations, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing, 1989 (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 139). Other eclectic writings For Diogenes Laertius’ account of Aristotle’s views see 5.87  P.Moraux, ‘Diogène Laërce et le Peripatos’, Elenchos 7 (1986) 247–94. 5.88  [Aristotle] De mundo appears in editions of the collected works of Aristotle; cf. especially E.S.Forster and D.J.Furley, Aristotle: On Sophistical Refutations, etc., London/Cambridge, Mass., Heinemann/ Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1955, and bibliography there. Reale’s view that the work is a genuine early one of Aristotle is argued in 5.89  G.Reale (1974) Aristotele: Trattato sul cosmo, Naples, Loffredo, 1974; revised edn, Giovanni Reale and Abraham P.Bos, eds, Il trattato Sul cosmo per Alessandro attributo a Aristotele, Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1995. On the ‘Aristotelian’ Divisions see 5.90  C.Rossitto, ed., Aristotele ed altri: Divisioni, Padua, Antenore, 1984. 5.91  [Andronicus] On the Passions is edited by A.Glibert-Thirry, Pseudo- Andronicus de Rhodes, Peri pathôn, Leiden, Brill, 1977 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, suppl. 2). Adrastus and Aspasius 5.92  Aspasius’ commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is edited by G.Heylbut in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca vol. 19.1, Berlin, Reimer, 1889. 5.93  Annotated English translation of Aspasius by H.P.Mercken, forthcoming: London, Duckworth. 5.94  The anonymous scholia on Nicomachean Ethics 2–5 incorporating material from Adrastus are edited by G.Heylbut in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca vol. 20, Berlin, Reimer, 1892. See also 5.95  A.Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978. 5.96  F.Becchi, ‘Aspasio e i peripatetici posteriori: la formula definitoria della passione’, Prometheus 9 (1983) 83–104. 5.97 ——‘Aspasio, commentatore di Aristotele’, in H.Temporini and W.Haase (eds), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt vol. II.36.7, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1994, 5365–96. 5.98  A.Alberti and R.W.Sharples, eds, Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999. On Aristoteles, argued by Moraux to be the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, see 5.99  P.Moraux, ‘Aristoteles, der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967) 169–82. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS Texts and translations 5.100  Greek texts in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca vols 1–3, Berlin, Reimer, 1883–1901 (commentaries; various editors) and in 5.101  I.Bruns, ed., Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1–2, Berlin, Reimer, 1887– 1892 (other works). For spurious works see the bibliography in [5.127]. Editions of texts surviving in Arabic, many with translations, are listed in [5.127] and in 5.102  R.Goulet and M.Aouad, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise’, in R.Goulet, ed., Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques vol. 1, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1989, 125–39, to be modified in the light of 5.103  A.Hasnawi, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise vs Jean Philopon: notes sur quelques traités d’Alexandre ‘perdus’ en grec, conserves en arabe’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 4 (1994) 53–109. 5.104  F.W.Zimmermann, ‘Proclus Arabus rides again’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 4 (1994) 9–51. Editions, translations and commentaries of particular works Commentaries on Aristotle 5.105  J.Barnes, S.Bobzien, K.Flannery and K.Ierodiakonou, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1–7, London, Duckworth, 1991. (Annotated English translation.) 5.106  W.E.Dooley, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Metaphysics 1, London, Duckworth, 1989. (Annotated English translation.) 5.107  W.E.Dooley and A.Madigan, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Metaphysics 2 and 3, London, Duckworth, 1992. (Annotated English translation.) 5.108  A.Madigan, Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 4, London: Duckworth, 1993. (Annotated English translation.) 5.109  W.Dooley, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, London, Duckworth, 1993. (Annotated English translation.) 5.110  G.Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993. (Discusses material from Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle, Metaphysics A.) 5.111  E.Lewis, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Meteorology 4, London: Duckworth, 1996. (Annotated English translation). 5.112  M.Rashed, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise et la ‘Magna Quaestio’: Rôle et indépendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotélicien’, Les Études Classiques 63 (1995) 295–351. (On fragments of Alexander’s Physics commentary.) 5.113  M.Rashed, ‘A “new” text of Alexander on the soul’s motion’, in R.Sorabji, ed., Aristotle and After, University of London, School of Advanced Studies, 1997 (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, suppl. vol. 68), 181–95. On the Soul 5.114  A.P.Fotinis, The ‘De Anima’ of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Washington, University Press of America, 1979. (English translation and commentary; also includes On Intellect.) 5.115  P.Accattino and P.L.Donini, Alessandro di Afrodisia: L’anima, Rome and Bari, Laterza, 1996. (Italian translation and commentary.) On Intellect 5.116  F.M.Schroeder and R.B.Todd, Two Aristotelian Greek Commentators on the Intellect: The De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle De Anima 3.4–8, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990. (Medieval Sources in Translation, 33.) 5.117  Frederic M.Schroeder, ‘The Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 6.1 (1995). On Providence 5.118  S.Fazzo and M.Zonta, Alessandro d’Afrodisia, Sulla Provvidenza, Milan, Rizzoli, 1998. Quaestiones and Ethical Problems 5.119  R.W.Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1–2.15, London, Duckworth, 1992. (Annotated English translation.) 5.120——Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 2.16–3.15, London, Duckworth, 1994. (Annotated English translation.) 5.121——Alexander of Aphrodisias: Ethical Problems, London, Duckworth, 1990. (Annotated English translation.) On Fate 5.122  R.W.Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Fate, London, Duckworth, 1983. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) 5.123  P.Thillet, Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Traité du, Destin, Paris, Budé, 1984. (Greek text, annotated French translation.) 5.124  A.Magris, Alessandro di Afrodisia, Sul Destino (collana ‘I rari’), Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie S.p.A., 1996. (Italian translation, commentary.) 5.125  C.Natali, Alessandro di Afrodisia: Il Destino, Milan, Rusconi, 1996. (Italian translation, commentary.) On Mixture 5.126  R.B.Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, Leiden, Brill, 1976. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.) Studies: general A general survey, with full bibliography, in 5.127  R.W.Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation’, in H.Temporini and W.Haase, eds, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol. II.36.2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987, 1176–243. A much fuller survey in [5.76]. 5.128  G.Movia, Alessandro di Afrodisia tra naturalismo e misticismo, Padua, Antenore, 1970. 5.129  P.L.Donini, Tre studi sull’ aristotelismo nel II secolo d.C., Turin, Paravia, 1974. 5.130——Le scuole, l’anima, l’impero, Turin, Rosenberg and Sellier, 1982. 5.131  R.W.Sharples, ‘The School of Alexander’, in [5.78] 83–111. 5.132  G.Abbamonte, ‘Metodi Esegetici nel commento in Aristotelis Topica di Alessandro di Afrodisia’, Seconda Miscellanea Filologica, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Quaderni del dipartimento di scienze dell’antichità 17, Naples, Arte Tipografica, 1995, 249–66. 5.133  P.L.Donini, ‘Alessandro di Afrodisia e i metodi dell’ esegesi filosofica’, in Esegesi, parafrasi e compilazione in età tardoantica: Atti del Terzo Congresso dell’ Associazione di studi tardoantichi, a cura di C.Moreschini, Naples, 1995, 107–29. 5.134  R.W.Sharples, ‘Alexander and pseudo-Alexanders of Aphrodisias, scripta minima. Questions and problems, makeweights and prospects’, in W. Kullmann, J.Althoff and M.Asper, eds., Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike (ScriptOralia Bd. 95=Altertumswissenschaftliche Reihe Bd. 22), Tübingen: Günter Narr Verlag, 1998, 383–403. Studies on particular topics Logic 5.135  K.L.Flannery, SJ., Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Philosophia Antiqua, 62), Leiden, Brill, 1995. Physics 5.136  S.Pines, ‘Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri: a refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the theory of motion’, Isis 52 (1961) 21–54. Reprinted in id., Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Medieval Science, Jerusalem and Leiden, Magnes Press/Brill, 1986, 218–51. 5.137  P.Moraux, ‘Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3’, Hermes 95 (1967) 159–69. 5.138  N.Rescher and M.Marmura, Alexander of Aphrodisias: The Refutation of Galen’s Treatise on the Theory of Motion, Islamabad, Islamic Research Institute, 1969. 5.139  R.W.Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,’ Phronesis 27 (1982) 58–81. 5.140  S.Fazzo and H.Wiesner, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Kindî-circle and in al-Kindî’s cosmology’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 3 (1993) 119–53. Psychology and metaphysics 5.141  P.Moraux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d’Aristote, Liège/Paris, Faculté des Lettres/E.Droz, 1942. 5.142  E.P.Mahoney, ‘Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: an unnoticed dispute’, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 23 (1968) 268–96. 5.143  P.L.Donini, ‘L’anima e gli elementi nel De Anima di Alessandro di Afrodisia’, Atti dell’ Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 105 (1971) 61–107. 5.144  A.C.Lloyd, Form and Universal in Aristotle (ARCA, Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs, 4), Liverpool, Francis Cairns, 1981. 5.145  H.Robinson, ‘Form and the immateriality of the intellect from Aristotle to Aquinas’, in H.Blumenthal and H.Robinson, eds., Aristotle and the Later Tradition (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supplementary volume), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, 207–26. 5.146  D.K.W.Modrak, ‘Alexander on phantasia: a hopeless muddle or a better account?’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (1993), supplement, 173–97. 5.147  J.Ellis, ‘Alexander’s Defense of Aristotle’s Categories’, Phronesis 39 (1994) 69–89. 5.148  A.Madigan, ‘Alexander on Species and Genera’, in Lawrence P.Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in Late Antiquity, Washington, DC, The Catholic University of America Press, 1994, 74–91. 5.149  R.W.Sharples, ‘On Body, Soul and Generation in Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Apeiron 27 (1994) 163–70. 5.150  P.Accattino, ‘Generazione dell’anima in Alessandro di Afrodisia, De anima 2.10–11.13’, Phronesis 40 (1995) 182–201. Fate 5.151  P.L.Donini, ‘Stoici e megarici nel de fato di Alessandro di Afrodisia’, in G.Giannantoni, ed., Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1977, 174–94. 5.152  D.Frede, ‘The dramatisation of determinism: Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato’, Phronesis 27 (1982) 276–98. 5.153  J.Mansfeld, ‘Diaphonia in the argument of Alexander De fato chs 1–2’, Phronesis 33 (1988) 181–207. 5.154  P.L.Donini, ‘Il De fato di Alessandro: questioni di coerenza’, in H. Temporini and W.Haase, eds, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol.II.36.2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987, 1244–59. 5.155  R.Gaskin, ‘Alexander’s sea battle: a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias De fato 10’, Phronesis 38 (1993) 75–94. 5.156——The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1995. 5.157  P.L.Donini, ‘Doti naturali, abitudini e carattere nel De fato di Alessandro’, in K.A.Algra, P.W.van der Horst, D.T.Runia, eds, Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday, Leiden, Brill, 1996, 284–99. 5.158  S.Bobzien, ‘The inadvertent conception and late birth of the free-will problem’, Phronesis 43 (1998) 133–75. OTHER WORKS CITED (MISCELLANEOUS) 5.159  K.Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, Leiden, Brill, 1995. (Philosophia Antiqua, 65.) 5.160  J.E.Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992. 5.161——The Morality of Happiness, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 5.162  H.von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Leipzig, Teubner, 1903–24 (=SVF). 5.163  J.Barnes, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. 5.164——Aristotle, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982. 5.165  S.Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Sophistici Elenchi’ (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum , 7), Leiden, Brill, 1981. 5.166  T.Ebert, Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1991. 5.167  T.Göransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 61), Göteborg, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995. 5.168  H.B.Gottschalk, ‘Soul as harmonia’, Phronesis 16 (1971) 179–98. 5.169  A.Gotthelf, ed., Aristotle on Nature and Living Things: Philosophical and Historical Studies Presented to David M.Balme, Pittsburgh, Mathesis, 1985. 5.170  W.K.C.Guthrie, Aristotle: On the Heavens, London/Cambridge, Mass., Heinemann/Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1939. 5.171  E.C.Halper, One and Many in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’: The Central Books, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1989. 5.172  A.M.Ioppolo, Aristone di Chio, Naples, Bibliopolis, 1980. 5.173  M.Isnardi Parente, Filosofia e scienza nel pensiero ellenistico, Naples, Morano, 1991. 5.174  W.Neale and M.Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963. 5.175  J.G.Lennox, ‘Are Aristotelian species eternal’, in [5.169] 67–94. 5.176 ——‘Kinds, forms of kinds, and the more and less in Aristotle’s biology’, in A.Gotthelf and J.G.Lennox, eds., Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 339–59. 5.177  A.C.Lloyd, ‘The principle that the cause is greater than its effect’, Phronesis 21 (1976) 146–56. 5.178  J.Longrigg, Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians, London, Routledge, 1993. 5.179  J.Mansfeld, ‘Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic doxography and chronography’, in G.Cambiano, ed., Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica, Turin, Tirrenia, 1986, 1–59. 5.180  J.Mansfeld, ‘Physikai doxai and Problemata physika from Aristotle to Aëtius (and beyond)’, in [5.37] 63–111. 5.181  G.Movia, Anima e intelletto, Padua, Antenore, 1968. 5.182  I.Mueller, ‘Hippolytus, Aristotle, Basilides’, in Lawrence P.Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in Late Antiquity, Washington, DC, The Catholic University of America Press, 1994, 143–57. 5.183  A.Peck, Aristotle: Generation of Animals, London/Cambridge, Mass., Heinemann/Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1942. 5.184  P.Pellegrin, ‘Aristotle: a zoology without species’, in [5.169] 95–115. 5.185  C.B.Schmitt, ‘Aristotelian textual studies at Padua: the case of Francesco Cavalli’, in A.Poppi, ed., Scienza e filosofia all’ università di Padova nel quattrocento, Padua, Edizioni LINT, 1983, 287–314. 5.186  R.Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, London, Duckworth, 1988. 5.187  F.Ueberweg, ed. H.Flashar, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Die Philosophie der Antike, 3, Basel, Schwabe, 1983. 5.188  G.Verbeke, ‘Doctrine du pneuma et entéléchisme chez Aristote’, in G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L.Owen, eds, Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, 191–214. 5.189  J.Wiesner, ed., Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung: Paul Moraux gewidmet, vol. 1, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1985. 5.190 ——vol. 2, 1987. 5.191  E.Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen 3.24, Leipzig, Reisland, 1903.
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